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The Impact of Collective 
Bargaining on Competitiveness
and Employment 




How does collective bargaining affect the performance of the firm?
Does it improve or worsen productivity? Does collective bargaining
inherently increase costs? Are organized firms less profitable than
those which are not organized? Does union organization lower stock-
holder returns and discourage new investment? Are organized firms
more likely to fail than non-union firms? These questions have been a
topic of research, and of controversy, for more than a century. For most
of this period, researchers have sought to answer these questions
through detailed institutional analyses of firms and industries with
Union Policies and Industrial Management (Slichter 1941), which pro-
vides a landmark example. In the last 20 years, econometric methods
have been brought to bear on these questions. Beginning with “Trade
Unions in the Production Process” (Brown and Medoff 1978), more
than 60 published articles have examined some aspect of the collective
bargaining/firm performance relationship in the United States. The lit-
erature has grown sufficiently large—and remained controversial—
that there are four extant reviews: Hirsch and Addison (1986), Addison
and Hirsch (1989), Belman (1992), and Kuhn (1998).
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GENERAL THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Standard static economic models provide little room for unions to
have a positive effect on firm performance. In the static model, firms in
competitive industries operate on their efficiency frontiers. Unions,
interlopers in an already efficient production process, affect firms by
increasing compensation and negotiating rules that reduce the flexibil-
ity of work practices. Both lead to higher production costs and lower
profits. Higher wages and benefits of organized firms increase costs
and reduce profits, although these effects may be partially counteracted
if firms use their escalated compensation to attract more productive
employees. The labor productivity of organized firms may also be
higher than that of unorganized firms if they adjust to escalated labor
costs by substituting capital for more expensive labor. Despite such
adaptations, organized firms are seen as experiencing higher produc-
tion costs and reduced profits, because they have been moved away
from the profit-maximizing combination of inputs. The effects of
higher compensation are magnified where unions negotiate work rules
that limit management flexibility. Such rules move firms inside their
efficiency frontier, further degrading firm performance. The lower
profits and consequent lower rates of return on investment realized by
organized firms lead to lower levels of investment and increase the
likelihood of firms’ failure.
An implicit assumption of these models, one required for firms to
operate on their efficiency frontier, is that employee effort is fully
under the control of the firm and therefore maximized (Altman 2000).
While this reasonably holds where managers and owners have com-
plete information on their employees’ actions and can impose sanc-
tions in the absence of maximum efforts, in situations in which the
marginal transaction costs of writing effort-specific labor contracts,
metering and monitoring employees, and enforcing the contracts
exceed their marginal benefits (which is likely to be the case in the vast
majority of firms), employees will be afforded some discretion over
their work efforts. It is probable that firms can monitor and control the
physical effort expended by employees. Employee discretion over
effort is likely to be greatest, however, and most difficult for firms to
monitor when that effort involves sharing employee-specific informa-
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tion with the firm that can be used to enhance firm performance. Firms
which, because of the nature of their employment relationship, fail to
elicit the full discretionary information-sharing effort of their employ-
ees will suffer some degree of x-inefficiency and operate inside their
efficiency frontier. The lesser technical efficiency of such firms may,
however, be balanced by reduced direct labor costs if their “employ-
ment package” is less generous than that of firms which better elicit
employee effort and have higher output per unit of labor input. Where
employees have some control over work effort, different approaches to
the employment relationship may successfully coexist and be equally
effective at minimizing costs. 
If a firm is operating below its efficiency frontier, there may be
conditions under which unions would enhance firm performance.
Building on Altman’s approach, unionization may be viewed as a reor-
ganization of the production process, providing advantages and disad-
vantages for the firm. On the one hand, unions may have all the
negative efficiency effects contemplated by the leaner, traditional eco-
nomic theories. On the other hand, the representative and protective
functions of unions may provide opportunities for firms to better their
performance by eliciting greater commitment and information-sharing
effort from their employees than would be forthcoming in the absence
of a union. Employee information sharing is likely to be greater in a
unionized than in a non-union setting for two reasons: 1) collective
bargaining mandates negotiation and contact between the employer
and elected employee representatives, thus providing established chan-
nels that are accepted by employees; and 2) employees can negotiate
over the “price” to be paid for this information, perhaps in the form of
increased compensation, or guarantees that they will not be disadvan-
taged. In regimes lacking employee representation, the rules of the
workplace are often uncertain and their interpretation is, in the final
analysis, made unilaterally by an interested party. Under such condi-
tions, employees are likely to try to secure and improve their position
through opportunistic behavior such as reserving knowledge that is
potentially useful to the firm. Such behavior is less necessary where
there is employee representation, as there are established interpreta-
tions of rules and a structure that provides substantive and procedural
due process.1 Thus, unions and collective bargaining may improve firm
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performance by providing employee collective voice to which employ-
ers are legally required to listen.
In a non-union setting, with no formal, legally mandated voice
mechanism, employees’ fundamental means of communicating dissat-
isfaction with the employment relationship is through exit. This is
costly, as the firm loses trained and productive employees. In contrast,
unions provide a protected forum through which employees can make
their views known to their employer and reduce the impetus for
employees to leave the firm. The representative function of the union
also provides a structure through which the employer can elicit a frank
response to contemplated changes in the employment relationship and
seek employees’ untrammeled consent. Collective voice is particularly
important where the labor force has divergent interests, and where
changes in production arrangements and employment policies will
have divergent effects on the labor force. Collective organization pro-
vides a means through which employees can negotiate among them-
selves and develop a mutually acceptable arrangement with the
employer. 
Unionization may also improve firm performance by forcing
improvements in managerial performance. The costs of poor manage-
ment may be mitigated in a non-union workplace as bad production
planning, and inconsistent labor policies may be offset by low pay and
exceptional flexibility in the deployment of labor. Such solutions are
more expensive—if not unavailable—under collective bargaining,
where inordinate and ill-considered use of overtime, sudden shifts in
employment, and inconsistencies in the application of rules are limited
by the agreement. In order to survive and profit, organized firms have
to improve their planning of production and the quality of their super-
vision, in essence being “shocked” into efficient production practices.
Unions may also solve problems related to information, transaction
costs, and public goods through the hiring and training of employees.
In industries such as construction, where the term of employment with
any individual employer is short and there is substantial occupational
skill and knowledge, firms will be reluctant to undertake training as
they are unlikely to recover their costs. Unions potentially provide a
structure under which employers can collectively finance training pro-
grams for employees who will, over their working lives, be shared
among those firms. The union may also play an oversight role, ensur-
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ing that employers adhere to the training regime required to provide
appropriately skilled employees. In labor markets where employees are
transient among firms, unions may also serve to certify the skills of
employees and reduce the time and expenditure required to locate
appropriately skilled employees. 
A similar public goods situation might also exist outside construc-
tion. The longer employer tenure of unionized employees increases the
return from firm-specific training, as unionized employees are less
likely than their non-union counterparts to quit and take their training
elsewhere (see Freeman and Medoff 1986).
A final suggestion of the literature is that industrial relations cli-
mate rather than union organization, per se, is the key variable in deter-
mining the effect of collective bargaining on organizational
performance. Collective organization can provide a mechanism
through which managers and employees propose, discuss, and agree
upon the organization of the firm. In such circumstances, the firm is
likely to be more efficient than one in which decisions are taken unilat-
erally by management. In contrast, where relations between managers
and employees are conflictual, collective organization becomes a tool
in that conflict. It may be that the nature of the employment relation-
ship, the level of trust between the parties, the history of unilateralism
or mutuality, and the parties’ acceptance of the legitimacy of one
another’s goals play key roles in determining the effectiveness of an
organization, whether unionized or non-union, as well as the effective-
ness of collective bargaining on organizational performance.
The foregoing theoretical discussion points out that the efficiency
effects may not be as straightforward as traditional, lean economic the-
ories would predict. While collective bargaining and unionization may
negatively affect firms’ efficiency on the production frontier, it is not
likely that very many firms operate on that frontier at all times. Once
the assumption of efficient production in the absence of a union is
relaxed, it is possible to conceive of situations in which the presence of
a union might enhance efficiency, or be associated with no effect.
Thus, the predicted effects of unions on firm performance are not
unambiguously negative. The matter is best determined by empirical
work, and it is to that work that this chapter now turns. 
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EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
Empirical research on the effect of collective bargaining on organi-
zational performance typically addresses one of four broad topics: 1)
the effect on firm productivity and costs; 2) the effect on productivity
growth; 3) the effect on firm profits, investment, and survival; and 4)
the role of industrial relations climate on organizational outcomes.
Drawing on Belman (1992) and on Kuhn (1998), we review the litera-
ture on the United States up to the early 1990s and supplement this
with a discussion of more recent research.2
Effects on Productivity and Costs
The effect of unions on firm productivity and costs has been stud-
ied by comparisons across industries, within industries, and within
firms. While the former has the advantage of providing more general
answers to the question of interest, the more narrowly defined within-
industry and within-firm studies are advantageous in using measure-
ment of inputs and outputs and models that better reflect the industry or
organization under study. For example, while inter-industry studies
must use price-based measures of output, such as value added, industry
studies may use physical as well as price-based measures of output.
There are only two inter-industry studies of productivity and costs:
Brown and Medoff (1978) and Clark (1984). The former, which con-
siders the effect of union density on state by industry-value added, sug-
gests that organized establishments are between 19.5 and 24 percent
more productive, depending on the controls incorporated into the
model. Using a product line data set for 250 large firms, Clark finds a
small, economically inconsequential union effect on productivity. Bel-
man (1992) suggests that the difference between these findings might
be reconciled if positive productivity effects are the consequence of
shock effects in less well managed small and mid-sized firms. Larger
firms, such as those found in Clark’s sample, may already be well man-
aged and so do not benefit from organization. Neither study indicates
that unions have a consistently negative effect on productivity, as sug-
gested by standard theory.
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Intra-industry studies of the effect of unions on productivity and
costs are more prevalent than inter-industry studies. These include the
cement industry (Clark 1980a,b), construction (Allen 1984, 1986a,b,
1988b; Cavalluzzo and Baldwin 1993), hospitals (Sloan and Adamache
1984; Register 1988), banking (Graddy and Hall 1985), coal (Conner-
ton, Freeman, and Medoff 1983; Boal 1990; Boal and Pencavel 1994;
Byrnes et al. 1987), wooden furniture (Frantz 1976), machining
(Kelley and Xue 1990), steel finishing (Ichniowski and Shaw 1995),
and trucking (Delery et al. 2000). Considering the studies prior to
1992, Belman (1992) concluded that the effects of unions on produc-
tivity and costs vary by industry and by the period under consideration.
There is scant evidence that unions act to reduce productivity. The only
consistent negative finding was in the banking sector, while there is
substantial evidence that unions act to improve productivity in many
industries. Clark’s work on cement plants finds that organization is
associated with a productivity shock effect of 7 to 12 percent. The
extensive work on construction by Allen suggests that organization is
associated with higher productivity, particularly on projects that
require higher-skilled workers.
Union effects on costs are less clear-cut than union effects on pro-
ductivity. Unions reduce unit costs in private construction but are asso-
ciated with higher unit costs in public construction. Later work by
Cavalluzzo and Baldwin (1993) suggests that labor productivity was
38 percent higher on organized construction sites. The outcomes in
construction are of particular interest because of the role that building
trades unions play in the training process and in reducing employer
search costs.
Extractive industries have a reputation for conflictual labor rela-
tions, and studies of bituminous coal confirm the centrality of indus-
trial conflict in determining unions’ effect on productivity (Kerr,
Harbison, and Dunlop 1960). Byrnes et al. (1987) found that organized
surface mines were more productive than their non-union counterparts.
Connerton, Freeman, and Medoff (1983) found that the effect of
unions on mine productivity varied: in periods of labor peace, orga-
nized mines were 30 percent more productive than non-union mines; in
periods of industrial conflict, organized mines were 15 percent less
productive than non-union mines. Boal (1990) considers the effect of
unions on productivity in the 1920s, while Boal and Pencavel (1994)
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examine the effect on days of operation from 1897 to 1937. The first
finds that unions did not affect productivity in larger mines in the
1920s but were associated with lower productivity in smaller mines.
Boal suggests that this is the result of the lesser sophistication in labor
relations in smaller mines. Boal and Pencavel find no relationship
between unionization and days of operation except for the period from
1921 to 1930, when mines in fully organized counties had 25 percent
fewer operating days than mines in unorganized counties. Although the
authors suggest that this is the result of unions’ limitation of days of
work, this was also a period of intense conflict—conflict that eventu-
ally led to federal military intervention, as the industry in West Vir-
ginia de-unionized. The negative effect of organization on operating
days is then as likely to have reflected the events around the long
strike, such as the Matewan Massacre and the Battle of Beal Mountain
as a commitment to limiting working days.3
Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1994) and Hirsch (1991b) are unique in
using Compustat data to examine the effect of unions on multiple mea-
sures of firm performance, including profitability, investment, sales,
employment growth, and productivity.4 Bronars, Deere, and Tracy use
the union contract files of the Bureau of Labor Statistics to obtain
matching data on the extent of organization by firm. The authors test
several specifications and compare results obtained with their firm
level unionization measure with the use of more aggregate measures of
union density. Although results vary considerably by specifications,
the findings suggest that firms with higher unionization have higher
productivity in manufacturing, suggesting that unionized employers
offset the union wage and benefit premium through improved produc-
tivity. Outside manufacturing, the relationship is too sensitive to speci-
fication, functional form, and period to support any conclusions about
union effects.5 This research considers whether unions influence other
aspects of firm performance, including capital expenditures, capital-to-
labor ratios, advertising-to-sales ratios, and investment in research and
development, and it finds little evidence for any effect.
In contrast, Hirsch (1991b) finds that organized firms are substan-
tially less productive than similar non-union firms. Data on unioniza-
tion were obtained from a survey of Compustat firms. Initial estimates
indicate that firms with the average level of organization (42.3 percent)
would have 3.5 percent lower factor productivity as measured by value
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added per employee. The results are sensitive to inclusion of industry
controls. Models with no controls for industry indicate much larger
negative union productivity effects; estimates from models that include
highly disaggregate measures of industry find union productivity
effects in the range of –1 to –1.5 percent. Conflation of industry effects
with firm unionization is also apparent in the preferred estimate, which
incorporates measures of the characteristics of two-digit industry,
including a measure of industry union density. The coefficient on
industry density is positive and sufficiently large in magnitude: a 10-
percentage-point increase in industry density would be associated with
a 2.8-percentage-point increase in firm productivity, to potentially off-
set the negative effect of firm union density. Hirsch speculates that this
effect is due to escalated product prices in heavily organized industries
or incomplete specification of the determinants of productivity corre-
lated with industry density. The sensitivity of the estimates to industry
controls may, however, reflect measurement problems in the construc-
tion of the dependent variable, value added per employee, suggesting
that the estimates of union effects may be inaccurate.6
Two recent studies provide indirect evidence of a negative union
productivity effect in steel and in trucking. Ichniowski and Shaw’s
1995 study of steel finishing lines focuses on the determinants and con-
sequences of human resource management practices. They find that
human resource management (HRM) practices cluster on a continuum
from traditional to new and that the cluster of the newest practices is
associated with a 6 percent higher ratio of actual to scheduled operat-
ing time. Organized plants, however, are substantially less likely to
adopt new HRM practices. Although the authors do not test the effect
of unions on operating time per se, by reducing the likelihood that
firms adopt more efficient HRM practices, unions are potentially asso-
ciated with lower productivity. Delery et al. (2000) examine the
premise that organized firms have lower turnover and quit rates among
trucking firms with 30 or more employees. Their evidence suggests
that, after accounting for the effect of unions on wages, neither unions
nor “voice” procedures are associated with reduced turnover or quits.7
Taken together, current studies remain favorable to the view that
collective bargaining typically has a favorable positive effect on the
productivity performance of the firm, suggesting that non-union firms
rarely operate at maximum efficiency. The union effects, however,
54 Belman and Block
vary considerably by industry and by time period, and they are sensi-
tive to the degree of conflict between employees and employers.
Where it has been studied, the effect of unions on costs is typically less
favorable as gains in productivity are offset by escalated compensation
costs.
Effects on Profitability, Investment, and Firm Failure
While studies of productivity and costs are fundamentally about
the effect of collective bargaining on firm efficiency, studies of profit-
ability consider both the efficiency and distributional effects of bar-
gaining. Although any negative effect on profits may originate in
reduced efficiency, it may also result from unions using bargaining
power to claim part of the profits typically going to shareholders.
Research interest has focused on the subsidiary issue of the circum-
stances under which unions can claim a share of firm profits. In com-
petitive markets, unions’ claim of a share of capital income would
result, in time, in the firm going out of business as new capital was
diverted from reinvestment in the company. Once the assumption of
competitive markets is relaxed, however, the long-run results of union
diversion of profits to compensation become difficult to predict. For
example, where a firm realizes rents from market power in imperfectly
competitive markets, the firm may generate sufficient profits to main-
tain investment at an optimal level. In such a situation, the union com-
pensation premium may be a diversion from other uses of profits, such
as dividends. In addition, unions may be able to claim quasi-rents from
physical investment where such investment is not readily reversed and
is long lived. 
Studies of profitability, the most common topic of research, may
be divided between those that use firm data to construct measures such
as price/cost margins ([sales – payroll – materials costs] / sales) and
Tobin’s q (value of firms equity and debt / replacement cost of assets),
and those that use stock market data to assess the effect of changes in
union status and collective bargaining outcomes on the valuation of
firm stocks. An almost universal result from these studies is that unions
are associated with reduced profitability. What remains at issue is cir-
cumstances under which unions are able to claim a share of firm prof-
its.
The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Competitiveness and Employment 55
Freeman (1983), Freeman and Medoff (1984), Karier (1985,
1988), and Voos and Mishel (1986) have estimated the effect of unions
on profitability using industry data obtained from the U.S. Census.
Although such studies suffer the disadvantage of using data averaged
across firms within an industry, the data reflect firms’ domestic (U.S.)
operations, simplifying the specification of equations and providing an
appropriate match between dependent and explanatory variables. Free-
man and Freeman and Medoff find that price/cost margins are reduced
between 0 and 37 percent and return on capital was reduced between 9
and 32 percent in the presence of unions, but that unions did not reduce
firms’ profitability in competitive markets. Karier finds similar results
with unions reducing price/cost margins by 14 percent in highly
monopolized markets but having no effect in competitive markets.
Voos and Mishel find that unions reduce price/cost margins by
between 22 and 35 percent but do not consider the effect of competi-
tiveness of the market.
Studies of firms are potentially superior to industry studies,
because the lower level of aggregation may allow researchers to better
isolate the mechanisms through which unions affect profitability. This
advantage is purchased at the cost of challenges in collection of data.
Data on the firm unionization are not available from standard sources;
researchers must locate appropriate sources and compile the data.
Becker and Olson (1992) used pension data collected by the U.S.
Department of Labor to estimate union density for large firms; Hirsch
(1991a) conducted a survey of Compustat firms that collected data on
organization; Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1994) use data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics collective bargaining agreement file to
determine unionization levels within the firm. All of these approaches
result in partial samples of the population of firms. Hirsch reports
obtaining data from 620 of 1,900 Compustat firms initially surveyed,
and Bronars et al. sample sizes range from 120 to 130, less than 10 per-
cent of the Compustat firms. Such extensive incomplete coverage
raises the potential for substantial nonrandomness in the sample and
consequent bias in the estimates.8 A second daunting problem is that
because measures of firm profitability include profits from overseas
operations, the models need to incorporate controls for the extent and
performance of overseas operations. The absence of controls for for-
eign operations from any of the firm estimates shadows this literature.9
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Finally, Standard & Poor’s Compustat data are limited to very large
firms and, as such, are unrepresentative of the economy as a whole.
Belman (1992) reviews studies by Salinger (1984), Clark (1984),
Hirsch and Connolly (1987), Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschy (1986),
Becker and Olson (1992), Voos and Mishel (1986), and Allen
(1988a,b). As with the industry studies, these studies suggest that orga-
nized firms have lower price/cost margins and lower q’s than firms that
are not organized. For example, Clark found that unions reduced
returns on sales by 16 percent while reducing returns on capital by 19
percent. As in the industry studies, another issue is whether unions
reduce the profits of all firms, or only of firms that are earning eco-
nomic rents. Salinger’s work suggests that unions reduce monopoly
rents. Hirsch and Connolly (1987), however, do not support this con-
clusion. They find that unions capture rents from sunk research and
development investments. These results are specific to Tobin’s q but
are not found when price/cost margins are the dependent variable.10
Becker and Olson (1992) also find that the negative relationship
between unionization and profits is related to union capture of rents on
intangibles, but, as with Hirsch’s research, these results are sensitive to
the measure of profit. In contrast to other studies, Allen finds that
unions do not reduce profits in construction. The unique nature of
unionism in construction, which results in substantial employer savings
in recruitment and training costs in a transient labor market for gener-
ally skilled employees, may account for this difference.
More recent research is provided by Hirsch (1990, 1991a,b, 1992),
Hirsch and Morgan (1994), and Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1994). Hir-
sch’s extensive work on this issue builds on his survey of firms in the
Compustat database to determine the company’s extent of unionization
in the 1970s and 1980s.11 These data were then matched to Compustat
panels on firms to measure the relationship between firm unionization
and various measures of firm performance between 1972 and 1980.
Depending on the specification used, Tobin’s q is 20 percent lower,
and return on capital, π, is 14 percent lower in the typical union firm
(with union density of 42.3 percent). Estimates of the effect of unions
on profits are, however, sensitive to controls for industry, particularly
to inclusion of industry indicator variables. In the presence of such
indicators, the coefficient on firm density becomes nonsignificant for q
and becomes small and only marginally significant for π.12 Further esti-
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mates suggest that the reduced profitability of organized firms may be
attributed to unions appropriating rents from firms’ investments in
research and development and fixed capital and that, as a result, orga-
nized firms may invest less than unorganized firms in research and
development and fixed capital.13 These results are consistent with
unions capturing rents where firms are unable to protect those rents
from partial appropriation through collective bargaining. Building on
prior work by Becker and Olson (1986), Hirsch and Morgan (1994)
find that shareholder risks decline with the extent of union coverage in
the 1970s. They found that highly unionized firms had lower returns
during this period but that this relationship between shareholder returns
and coverage broke down in the 1980s.
Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1994) also examine the effect of union-
ization on profitability for three measures of profitability: Tobin’s q,
the ratio of excess market valuation to sales, and the ratio of net operat-
ing income to sales, using several specifications. Focusing on the spec-
ifications that include controls for industry and firm characteristics,
there is no evidence that Tobin’s q or the ratio of excess valuation to
sales is lower among organized firms in the manufacturing sector, but
the net operating income to sales ratio in fully organized firms is esti-
mated to be 3 to 4 percent below that of an otherwise similar non-union
firm. Among the nonmanufacturing firms, Tobin’s q in a completely
organized firm would be 18 to 22 percent below that of a similar unor-
ganized firm, but there is no significant union effect on the other mea-
sures of profitability. First, differencing of the data eliminates any
meaningful statistical relationship between unionization and profitabil-
ity except for a negative effect for the ratio of excess market valuation
to sales in nonmanufacturing. The sensitivity of the estimates to the
sector, measure of profitability, and specification of the variables sug-
gests that although some specifications of the profits equation produce
the expected negative relationship, that relationship is tenuous, particu-
larly in the manufacturing sector.14
Stock market studies consider the effect of events related to collec-
tive bargaining on the market value of firms. Under the assumption that
stock markets are efficient processors of information, changes in stock
valuation in response to new information reflect the expected effect of
these shifts on the performance of the firm. Changes in stock valuation
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in response to strikes, representation elections, and settlement of con-
tracts will then reflect unions’ effect on firm outcomes.
Events that are viewed as favorable to unions are generally associ-
ated with a reduction in the market valuation of the firm’s stock.
Rubeck and Zimmerman (1984) find a decline in stock valuation both
when a petition for a representation election is filed and when the elec-
tion is held. Stock valuation declines between 1.3 percent if the union
loses and 3.8 percent if it wins. Both Greer, Martin, and Reusser (1980)
and Becker and Olson (1986) found a decline in stock valuation fol-
lowing a strike. In contrast, concessionary contracts were associated
with an increase in stock valuation (Becker 1987). Although these
results might indicate that stockholders expect organized firms would
operate less efficiently, it may also reflect a belief that union success
will lead to the redistribution of profits from stockholders to employ-
ees. There is also internal evidence in these studies that profit declines
preceded organization and that union activity might be a response to
worsening economic performance. 
Freeman and Kleiner (1999) consider the effect of organization on
the survival of firms. In the first part of this study, the authors use
Compustat data to examine the likelihood of a firm going out of busi-
ness. Using a modest set of controls, the authors find that organization
itself reduces the likelihood of a firm becoming insolvent but that the
likelihood of insolvency rises with the level of organization. The most
highly organized firms have a 23 percent likelihood of becoming insol-
vent, relative to a 19 percent probability of insolvency for non-union
firms, for the period under consideration. In the second part of the
study, the displaced worker supplement of the Current Population Sur-
vey is used to determine the effect of union membership on the proba-
bility that an employee was displaced by the permanent closure of a
plant. Freeman and Kleiner’s estimates indicate that union membership
is unrelated to plant closing or any form of displacement. They suggest
that these results are consistent with the hypothesis that unions behave
in an economically rational manner in not increasing wages to the point
at which the firm, plant, or business lines close down.
Taken together, the studies of the effect of collective bargaining on
profits, investment, and firm failure suggest that unions do not fully
pay for their higher wages and benefits through increasing productivity
and reducing costs. They act to redistribute part of the shareholders’
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earnings to employees, but this redistribution occurs where firms are
earning rents or quasi-rents. However, the redistribution is not so large
as to endanger the economic viability of the firm.
Collective Bargaining Practices and Competitiveness
The previous discussion focused on the effect of the mere inci-
dence of collective bargaining on organizational outcomes that might
be associated with the competitiveness of the firm. There is no reason
to believe, however, that the existence of a bargaining relationship per
se would necessarily result in improved firm competitiveness. Collec-
tive bargaining traditionalists might contend that the major purpose of
collective bargaining is to provide employees with workplace repre-
sentation rather than to encourage firm competitiveness. To the extent
that this is the case, only when the union and the employer believe it is
in their mutual interests to move the process toward encouraging com-
petitiveness will it be used that way.
Since the early 1980s, many firms and unions have moved toward
innovative collective bargaining and cooperative relationships as a
means for fostering improved firm competitiveness and increased
employment protection and job creation (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie
1986; Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996). A literature has developed that
has examined the success of these innovations, and much of the pre-
1990s literature is included in Belman’s 1992 review. A series of stud-
ies of General Motors (Katz, Kochan, and Gobielle 1983; Kochan,
Katz, and Mower 1985; Katz, Kochan, and Weber 1985) investigated
the relationship between innovative industrial relations programs,
industrial relations outcomes, and plant-level economic performance.
They suggest that such programs have positive effects on the quality of
production and a weaker but positive effect on labor efficiency (pro-
ductivity). These studies also find that higher levels of conflict, such as
escalated levels of grievance filing and disciplinary activity, are associ-
ated with reduced product quality and productivity. Schuster (1983)
examined the impact of profit-sharing plans, gain-sharing plans, labor–
management committees, quality circles, and quality of work life pro-
gram on productivity (sales per employee hour worked), employment,
product quality, absenteeism, voluntary turnover, tardiness, grievances,
and employment security with a before-and-after study of 38 firms in
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the eastern United States. Such programs had a positive impact on pro-
ductivity but little effect on product quality, employment, turnover,
absenteeism, tardiness, and the grievance rate. There was a strong link-
age between employment security guarantees and firms’ economic per-
formance, but only 3 of 38 firms provided such guarantees.
Rubinstein (2000) examined the difference in first-time product
quality associated with union and non-union at the comanaged Saturn
plant in Tennessee. Rubinstein found that the communications net-
works associated with union managers were associated with higher
first-time quality than the communications networks associated with
non-union managers. 
Several studies suggest that the availability of formal procedures
for resolving grievances is associated with improved firm performance
but that escalated levels of grievance activity are associated with lower
productivity and product quality (Norsworthy and Zabala 1985; Ich-
niowski and Lewin 1987; Ichniowski 1986; Goldberg and Brett 1979;
Spencer 1986). Ichniowski finds that the absence of a mechanism for
resolving grievances in a non-union paper mill resulted in the firm
operating 19.5 percent below full labor efficiency. 
Although the relationship between the quality of the collective bar-
gaining relationship and firm performance has not been widely studied
in the 1990s, there have been several notable additions to the literature.
In a survey based on 194 plant mangers, 74 union officers, and 135
headquarters personnel associated with the same firms, Cooke (1990)
found that high union leader involvement and frequent team meetings
were associated with perceived improvements (“much improvement”)
in quality, productivity, and supervisor–employee relations. Measures
of technological displacement had a mixed effect on these outcomes,
while concession bargaining measures were unrelated. In a study of
194 manufacturing firms throughout the United States and 131 manu-
facturing firms in Michigan, Cooke (1992) found that unionized firms
with jointly administered employee participation programs achieved
greater improvement on a subjective measure of product quality than
unionized firms without such programs, and that unionized firms with
jointly administered programs achieve quality gains equal to non-union
firms with participation programs. Subcontracting was found to have a
negative spillover on quality: firms that used subcontracting suffered
reduced product quality relative to firms that did not subcontract. Sum-
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marizing these findings, Cooke suggests that labor–management cli-
mate was a key determinant of quality. 
In a study of the economic impact of the change in the collective
bargaining relationship between Xerox and the Amalgamated Clothing
and Textile Workers, Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1991) finds that work
areas that could be identified as traditional (adversarial) were associ-
ated with significantly higher product costs, greater losses to scrap,
greater productivity variation, and lower net return (a measure of actual
vs. standard labor hours for producing a part) than work areas identi-
fied as transformational or transitional (work areas that exhibited less
measured conflict, greater speed of conflict resolution, problem solv-
ing, worker autonomy, and worker-initiated changes).
Kelley and Harrison (1992) report that the presence of labor–man-
agement committees in a sample of small unionized machining plants
was associated with lower levels of productivity and greater job inse-
curity. They suggest that this unexpectedly negative relationship is the
result of omitted mediating variables, such as vulnerability to foreign
competition. In their view, the adoption of labor–management commit-
tees is not random but a response to poor economic performance by the
firm. The presence of these committees may proxy for omitted vari-
ables that are the true source poor performance.
The current literature provides considerable favorable evidence on
the effect of innovative work structures on organizational performance.
Evidence on the role of unions in promoting or impeding the imple-
mentation of new work practices is mixed. Ichniowski and Shaw
(1995) find that organized steel finishing lines are less likely to adopt
the most advanced combination of work practices. Osterman (1994)
finds more mixed results in a study of the adoption of innovative work
practices, where such practices are defined by the adoption of teams,
job rotation, quality circles, and total quality management. The effect
of unions on innovation depends greatly on the construction of the
independent variable, with the estimated effect varying from positive
and weakly significant to nonsignificant to negative and weakly signif-
icant. Eaton and Voos (1992) suggest that the unions play an important
role in obtaining the genuine consent and participation of the labor
force, and that this makes adoption of workplace innovations both
more likely and effective. They suggest that, with the exception of
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profit-sharing plans, organized plants are more likely to adopt work-
place innovations than non-union plants.
Evidence on the effect of unions on training is mixed. Unions
appear to have little effect on the amount of training in small firms, but
they are associated with longer duration and total hours of training and
a greater use of formal training programs in a more representative
cross-section of firms. In a study of the effect of government subsidies
on firm training, Holzer et al. (1993) found that the presence of a union
did not affect the amount of annual quality-related training hours
offered by a population of small manufacturing firms in the years
1987–1989; training hours were determined primarily by whether the
firm received a government subsidy. In addition, there was no evidence
suggesting that the presence of a union affected the success of that
training, measured by a change in the scrap rate. Using a 1992 survey
of the Small Business Administration, Black, Noel, and Wang (1999)
find that weekly hours of formal and informal training are not affected
by the union status of firms. Organized firms, however, provide more
weeks of on- and off-site formal training than otherwise comparable
firms. A larger fraction of the training provided by organized firms is
formal, while non-union firms provide a larger fraction of their training
as informal training by managers or co-workers.
Summarizing the knowledge as of the early 1990s, Belman (1992)
wrote:
There is substantial variation in the effect of unions on firm per-
formance and this variation is caused by differences in the rela-
tionship between labor and management. Low trust/high conflict
environments, rather than unions, are the source of reduced pro-
ductivity. Higher levels of trust are associated with reduced strife
and, consequently, with both greater productivity and higher prod-
uct quality. Further, although the level of conflict is affected by
the conditions and history of a plant, firm and industry, the parties
can reduce the level of conflict and share the gains from improved
efficiency and quality. (Pp. 69–70)
Current evidence supports the view that special efforts by labor
and management to address issues of competitiveness improve product
quality and productivity but their effects may not be large. Rarely is
labor relations the basis on which the firm maintains its position in the
product (Block et al. 1987). Thus, labor relations is a contributor to
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firm competitiveness, but it is not reasonable to expect labor relations
to be the leading determinant of corporate performance. 
Collective Bargaining and Employment
Standard static neoclassical economic theory predicts that collec-
tive bargaining is associated with lower levels of employment,
although more developed theories suggest different possibilities. In the
standard theory, collective bargaining imposes labor costs on employ-
ers above what they would otherwise incur. Assuming competitive
product and labor markets and operation on its production frontier, a
firm will respond to above-market labor costs associated with collec-
tive bargaining by substituting capital for labor, thereby reducing
employment. If the firm is unable to substitute capital for labor, it
would operate below the level of maximum efficiency, with lower
employment than otherwise due to forgone revenues.
Contract curve or efficient contract theory suggests a somewhat
different result, as the union does not simply set a monopoly wage.
Rather, the union bargains with the firm for a wage that is between the
competitive and monopoly wage and a level of employment that is
above the monopoly and potentially above the competitive employ-
ment level. In such instances, collective bargaining might be associated
with higher rather than lower employment.
The negative employment effects contemplated by the standard
static model may also not be found if collective bargaining improves
productivity. In this case, the effects of the escalated wages are sub-
stantially and possibly fully offset by the productivity improvements
associated with collective bargaining. As organized firms’ unit labor
costs are no higher than that of non-union firms, employment will not
decline. If the productivity gains from organization are of sufficient
magnitude, organized firms may have lower unit labor costs and higher
employment than their non-union counterparts. This form of productiv-
ity gain is distinct from that which results when firms respond to esca-
lated union wages by substituting capital for labor. While increasing
the capital stock will boost labor productivity, it will, other things
equal, be associated with a decline in employment. If union labor is
itself more productive independent of the complementary capital stock,
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the increase in productivity occurs without any increase in capital stock
or decline in employment.
The interpretation of any negative employment findings is compli-
cated by a U.S. legal system that allows firms to escape collective bar-
gaining by investing away from the union. Under the U.S. system, a
firm may decide to eschew the difficult and expensive strategy of
directly eliminating collective bargaining in a plant that is already
organized. An alternative strategy is to accept collective bargaining
where it exists but strongly resist organization in new plants and focus
new investment in new, non-union plants. Employment declines in the
union sector as the capital stock that complements the unionized
employees becomes depreciated and obsolete. Thus, a negative rela-
tionship between unionization and employment growth might then be
the result of capital-stock-obsolescence-driven employment attrition in
unionized plants and union avoidance rather than direct adjustments to
escalated wages or other economic responses to collective bargaining.
A limitation of all of these models is that they make predictions
about the level of employment but say little about how collective bar-
gaining affects the rate of growth of employment. Some authors, such
as Leonard (1992), suggest that the reduced rates of profit predicted by
the standard neoclassical model will cause organized firms to have a
lower rate of employment growth, but these arguments are intuitive
and not derived from a formal model.
As noted by Kuhn (1998), research on the effect of unions on
employment in the United States is sparse.15 Leonard (1992) investi-
gates this issue with a sample of 1,798 California manufacturing plants
over the period between 1974 and 1980. In a model that included con-
trols for initial employment, corporate structure, percentage of noncler-
ical white-collar workers in the plant labor force, and industry and
regional indicators, employment in unionized plants grew 9 percent
more slowly than employment in non-union plants. When the sample
was separated by the union status of the plant, average annual employ-
ment growth rates were 4 percent lower in unionized plants. When
information on the vintage of plants was incorporated into a subsample
for which such information was available, there was no statistically
significant difference in the growth rates of union and non-union
plants. The latter result suggests that the slower growth of employment
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in organized plants may be due to unions’ inability to organize newer
facilities rather than any effect on employment growth rates per se.
As part of their study of Compustat firms, Bronars, Deere, and
Tracy (1994) found that the employment growth was significantly
slower among organized firms than among non-union firms. Employ-
ment in non-union manufacturing grew between 0.5 and 1.0 percentage
points faster than among organized firms, and between 0.6 and 1.1 per-
centage points faster among firms outside manufacturing.
Employment effects may also reflect union preferences. In a study
of bargaining behavior of locals of the International Typographical
Union in 13 small towns, MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986) found that
locals did not maximize rents at the expense of employment in negotia-
tions with newspapers. Rather, consistent with the efficient contracts
model, they accepted lower wages to minimize employment loss. In
contrast, in a study of employment in two-digit industry manufacturing
industries in 1972 and 83 construction projects in 1973–1974, Wessels
(1991) found a consistently negative relationship between unionization
and employment. Although significance varied by specification, the
results suggested that the relationship between collective bargaining
and employment was better described by a standard neoclassical
model. The difference in the results between the MaCurdy and Pen-
cavel and Wessels studies may reflect differences between the indus-
tries under study, as well as the varied goals and concerns of labor
organizations. The lower employment levels found on organized con-
struction projects is also consistent with the substantially greater pro-
ductivity of unionized workers found by Allen (1984, 1988a).
Dunne and MacPherson (1994) find that there was little correlation
between unionization rates by industry and plant closing between 1977
and 1982. However, industries with higher rates of organization had a
higher rate of employment loss due to contractions of plants and some-
what smaller job gains associated with plant expansions. Consistent
with the standard neoclassical theory, Linneman, Wachter, and Carter
(1990) find that the decline in employment in unionized industries is
greatest in those industries with the largest union/non-union wage dif-
ferentials.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Although standard economic theory generates straightforward pre-
dictions regarding the effect of unions and collective bargaining on
organizational performance, other more complex theoretical formula-
tions suggest that the effects of unions may be ambiguous and difficult
to predict a priori. The empirical research supports the latter position,
and suggests that unions and collective bargaining often have a posi-
tive rather than negative effect on productivity. As unions generally
increase costs of production, these results suggest that management is
generally able to adjust its production processes and employment lev-
els to unionization. Unions are also associated with lower profitability
than their non-union counterparts. Whether this negative effect on
profitability has a long-term negative impact on firm viability is deter-
mined by whether this union appropriation of profits is from dividends
or from internally financed investment and research and development.
Effects of unions and collective bargaining on other measures of orga-
nizational performance, such as product quality and training, tend to be
negligible (or positive) but small, suggesting that collective bargaining
does not alter these outcomes relative to what they would otherwise
have been in the absence of unions. There is evidence that cooperative
and nontraditional collective bargaining structures have a positive
impact on workplace outcomes, such as productivity and quality, but
have little effect on overall organizational performance. Finally, there
is some evidence of a negative employment effect associated with col-
lective bargaining and unionization, although it is difficult to determine
whether such effects are the result of union workplace practices or
employer opposition to unionism.
Overall, the effects of unions and collective bargaining are as var-
ied as might be expected in an economy with decentralized bargaining
structures and organizations with differing production functions, often
operating at less than maximum efficiency and participating in markets
with varying degrees of competitiveness. Straightforward predictions
about the effects of unions on firm performance are likely to be an
extreme oversimplifacation.
The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Competitiveness and Employment 67
Notes
1. Although it is possible for non-union employers to create voluntary employee
voice structures without union representation, in order to remain lawful, such
structures may not incorporate bilateral communications over terms and condi-
tions of employment. In addition, because these structures are controlled by the
employer, and because the employees lack protection, employees may be less
likely to share knowledge for fear it may be used to their disadvantage.
2. There has been no new literature on the effect of unions on productivity growth
since Belman’s review, and we omit this issue from our review.
3. This interpretation is reenforced by the Boal and Pencavel finding that unions
raised wages by a meager 5 percent in this period. It is unlikely that an organiza-
tion that had the ability to reduce operating days by one-quarter would settle for
such a small wage advantage that the members’ income was lower than their non-
union counterparts.
4. Discussion of issues involved in the use of firm data is put off to the section on the
effect of unions on firm profits.
5. Results range from negative and significant for 1975–1978 data with a Cobb-
Douglas with industry and additional controls, to positive and significant for
1979–1982 data with a Cobb-Douglas with industry and additional controls, to
negative and significant for the same year and specification when estimated with a
frontier approach.
6. Hirsch (1991b) reports that labor costs, an essential element in the calculation of
value added, are only available for one-quarter of the firms in the sample. For the
balance of the sample, labor costs are constructed by assigning industry average
labor costs to firms and assigning a 25 percent premium in labor costs to orga-
nized firms. This will create the observed negative correlation between unioniza-
tion and value added as well as a strong correlation between industry and value
added, and suggests that the estimates of firm level union productivity effects may
be the result of construction rather than an underlying relationship. These prob-
lems are unfortunate, as the conventional measure of productivity—output per
unit of labor—could have been constructed from Compustat data.
7. Delery et al.’s (2000) research is hampered by the low response rate to his survey
and the even lower response to questions on turnover and quit rates.
8. Hirsch (1991b) reports that the means for his sample are similar to the means for
the Compustat for the period under study. A more complete approach would have
been to test the means and variances to ensure that data came from similar distri-
butions and, because of the importance of industry to the study, to test means and
variances by industry.
9. The omission of controls for foreign operations is the consequence of applying
specifications developed for census industry/establishment data, which is limited
to domestic operations, to data on firms which includes foreign operations.
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10. Using a cross-section of New York firms, Hirsch and Link (1987) find that union-
ization is associated with firm managers perceiving their firms as being less inno-
vative than their competitors.
11. Hirsch’s approach to obtaining firm-level unionization data differs from that of
Becker and Olson (1992), who used pension data to determine firm unionization,
and of Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1994), who used the collective bargaining files
at the Bureau of Labor Statistics to determine the extent of organization. The sur-
vey was sent to 1,904 firms, and useable replies were obtained from 475 firms.
This was supplemented with data from an additional 157 firms, which reported in
a 1972 survey by the Conference Board. The final sample size was 632 firms.
12. The effect of controls for industry is found in Hirsch (1990). Similar results
appear to characterize Table 4.4 of Hirsch (1991b) but, due to a misprint, this is
not certain.
13. The measure of π is the gross return on capital (income plus depreciation plus
interest income less inventory and imputed income adjustments) per unit of capi-
tal. Firm profitability is more typically constructed as net income per unit of capi-
tal, or as net operating income per unit of sales, and it is uncertain whether the
results for π as constructed by Hirsch would obtain with the more conventional
measures.
14. Although current studies treat unionization as a strictly exogenous variable, it
may be simultaneous with profitability. One explanation of this is that unions seek
to organize more profitable firms, resulting in a positive causal link between prof-
itability and organization. A second possible explanation suggests that under U.S.
labor law, large firms resist unionization by replacing union facilities with non-
union facilities and resisting organization of non-union plants. Resisting unions is
costly and is likely pursued more effectively by profitable firms and industries.
This suggests a negative causal relationship from profitability to unionization.
Either causal link would result in bias in estimates of the unionization/profitability
relationship, which did not allow for simultaneity, but the direction of the bias is
uncertain.
15. As in the balance of this review, we do not include articles that center on other
countries or in which discussion and analysis of the United States is incidental.
This reflects the focus of this review, and with regard to empirical work, authors
view that cross-country measures of differences in employment relation systems
are difficult to construct and their results even more difficult to interpret. Two
articles that attempt to sort out the effects of international institutions on employ-
ment growth are Addison, Teixeira, and Grosso (2000) and Buchele and Chris-
tiansen (1999).
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